Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
What Trump might do on vaccines, pandemics, global health, and more
Learn the bipartisan lessons of the past to prevent future biological crises
For decades, American presidential administrations of both parties have made combatting biological threats a priority on their national security to-do list. In 2020, I spoke out about President Donald Trump’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and dismissiveness towards bipartisan lessons and preparedness tools his team received when he entered office. Though no administration could have been perfectly prepared for COVID, the results of Trump’s disregard were predictable; when the virus struck, chaos ensued. Instead of uniting in the face of crisis, states and cities were left divided and competing for scarce resources. Americans suffered and lives were lost as a result.
Looking forward, important new plans and response playbooks have emerged not only from COVID-19, but from the many additional outbreaks the United States has fought over the last four years from mpox to H5N1 influenza, to Marburg. I draw hope from state and local innovations, such as those uncovered by the American Democracy and Health Security Initiative. The federal government and our nation’s governors, mayors, tribal leaders, school administrators, businesses and community organizations learned precious lessons, which must be preserved. The path ahead for our nation’s biodefense is clear: we must lean into and build on this vital work.
In this spirit, the administration should reject a biosecurity to-do list that sows divisiveness, driving Democrats and Republicans into their respective corners and failing to capitalize on hard-fought lessons from states, cities, and tribes. Instead, it should adopt a bipartisan biosecurity agenda that protects all Americans by onshoring and friend-shoring critical supplies, while simultaneously bolstering global financing solutions that enable low- and lower-middle-income countries to access countermeasures and stop outbreaks at the source. It should double down on investing in the 100 Days Mission, an effort built on Operation Warp Speed, achieve safe and effective vaccines, tests, and treatments for every potentially pandemic pathogen. And it must strengthen preparedness to deter and guard against the potential for deliberate or accidental biological misuse.
Such an agenda would recognize that biological disasters affect everyone, everywhere, all at once and that Americans can only be safe from disease threats if diseases are fought and stopped everywhere in the world. Crucially, this means doubling down on the US target to assist at least 50 countries with health security capacity and catalyze capacity in 50 more through a strong Pandemic Fund. It would require not only remaining at the table in the World Health Assembly, the governing body of the World Health Organization (WHO), but also using that seat to play a stronger leadership role in advancing global health security. Conversely, walking away would have negative impacts on Americans and create space for competitors and adversaries that seek harm to our interests. And it would mean working to build the world’s strongest bioeconomy, safeguarding emerging biotechnologies against deliberate and accidental misuse, and building capacity to detect and respond to disease threats around the world.
Finally, to achieve these goals, the incoming administration must adopt and invest in the work of the National Security Council’s Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense and the White House Office on Pandemic Preparedness and Response. These non-partisan experts have spent years building a national and global firefighting team to enhance American readiness for biological threats. This team should be empowered and expanded, not shuttered.
It’s highly likely the incoming administration will have to deal with a major health emergency very early in its tenure. In 2025, we will learn whether the new administration will pick up where it left off or whether it can turn the page on past pandemic performance and prevent future biological catastrophes.
–Elizabeth (Beth) Cameron is a professor of the practice and senior advisor to the Pandemic Center at the Brown University School of Public Health.
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For decades, American presidential administrations of both parties have made combatting biological threats a priority on their national security to-do list. In 2020, I spoke out about President Donald Trump’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic and dismissiveness towards bipartisan lessons and preparedness tools his team received when he entered office. Though no administration could have been perfectly prepared for COVID, the results of Trump’s disregard were predictable; when the virus struck, chaos ensued. Instead of uniting in the face of crisis, states and cities were left divided and competing for scarce resources. Americans suffered and lives were lost as a result.
Looking forward, important new plans and response playbooks have emerged not only from COVID-19, but from the many additional outbreaks the United States has fought over the last four years from mpox to H5N1 influenza, to Marburg. I draw hope from state and local innovations, such as those uncovered by the American Democracy and Health Security Initiative. The federal government and our nation’s governors, mayors, tribal leaders, school administrators, businesses and community organizations learned precious lessons, which must be preserved. The path ahead for our nation’s biodefense is clear: we must lean into and build on this vital work.
In this spirit, the administration should reject a biosecurity to-do list that sows divisiveness, driving Democrats and Republicans into their respective corners and failing to capitalize on hard-fought lessons from states, cities, and tribes. Instead, it should adopt a bipartisan biosecurity agenda that protects all Americans by onshoring and friend-shoring critical supplies, while simultaneously bolstering global financing solutions that enable low- and lower-middle-income countries to access countermeasures and stop outbreaks at the source. It should double down on investing in the 100 Days Mission, an effort built on Operation Warp Speed, achieve safe and effective vaccines, tests, and treatments for every potentially pandemic pathogen. And it must strengthen preparedness to deter and guard against the potential for deliberate or accidental biological misuse.
Such an agenda would recognize that biological disasters affect everyone, everywhere, all at once and that Americans can only be safe from disease threats if diseases are fought and stopped everywhere in the world. Crucially, this means doubling down on the US target to assist at least 50 countries with health security capacity and catalyze capacity in 50 more through a strong Pandemic Fund. It would require not only remaining at the table in the World Health Assembly, the governing body of the World Health Organization (WHO), but also using that seat to play a stronger leadership role in advancing global health security. Conversely, walking away would have negative impacts on Americans and create space for competitors and adversaries that seek harm to our interests. And it would mean working to build the world’s strongest bioeconomy, safeguarding emerging biotechnologies against deliberate and accidental misuse, and building capacity to detect and respond to disease threats around the world.
Finally, to achieve these goals, the incoming administration must adopt and invest in the work of the National Security Council’s Directorate on Global Health Security and Biodefense and the White House Office on Pandemic Preparedness and Response. These non-partisan experts have spent years building a national and global firefighting team to enhance American readiness for biological threats. This team should be empowered and expanded, not shuttered.
It’s highly likely the incoming administration will have to deal with a major health emergency very early in its tenure. In 2025, we will learn whether the new administration will pick up where it left off or whether it can turn the page on past pandemic performance and prevent future biological catastrophes.
–Elizabeth (Beth) Cameron is a professor of the practice and senior advisor to the Pandemic Center at the Brown University School of Public Health.